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ABSTRACT: This article inserts itself into larger discussions regarding post-dictatorship memory politics in Portu-
gal and comparative studies of similar histories of violence in Europe, particularly examinations of National-Social-
ism, Nazism and the Holocaust, as well as comparative studies of twentieth-century fascist dictatorships in the Ibe-
rian peninsula. In spite of the revolutionary, radical nature of the Portuguese democratisation process, studies 
conducted during the last four decades on the social and political (re)constructions of memory regarding the Portu-
guese dictatorship (1926-1974) have demonstrated that state policies regarding the past have depicted the dictator-
ship as one that is very similar to events in countries where the process of democratic transition was actually quite 
different from that of Portugal. Right-wing groups and those who self-describe as “victims” of processes of decolo-
nisation that occurred between 1974 and 1975 have established a pattern of public debate that leaves no room for 
discussing the dictatorship without also referring to the 1974-1975 Revolution. This mode of debate seems to sug-
gest that these two periods of history are indicative of a global regime phenomenon and that both the processes of 
decolonisation and revolution affected Portuguese society in similar ways. This paper attempts to complicate these 
narratives in order to question the democratic forms that emerged after the Revolution and to compare it to Salazar’s 
dictatorial regime. 
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RESUMEN: Dictadura y Revolución: Reconstrucciones sociopolíticas de la memoria colectiva en la Portugal po-
sautoritaria. - Este artículo se encuadra en una discusión más amplia sobre las políticas de la memoria de la posdic-
tadura salazarista en Portugal, y en estudios comparados sobre historias semejantes de violencia en Europa, especial-
mente las relativas al nacional-socialismo, el nazismo y el Holocausto. También se refiere a los estudios comparados 
sobre las dictaduras fascistas en la Península Ibérica. A pesar de la naturaleza revolucionaria y radical del proceso de 
democratización portugués, los estudios llevados a cabo durante las últimas cuatro décadas sobre las (re)construccio-
nes sociales y políticas de la memoria de la dictadura portuguesa (1926-1974) demuestran que las políticas de estado 
han elaborado un relato de la dictadura en relación con procesos de transición a la democracia que son muy diferen-
tes del portugués. Grupos de extrema derecha y aquéllos que se describen a sí mismos como “víctimas” del proceso 
de descolonización que tuvo lugar entre 1974 y 1975 han conseguido consolidar en el debate público unos argumen-
tos que no deja espacio para discutir la dictadura sin relacionarla con la revolución de 1974-1975. Los términos de 
este debate sugieren que estos dos procesos históricos – descolonización y revolución – afectaron a la sociedad de 
manera semejante. Este texto trata de descifrar la complejidad de estos relatos para poder cuestionar las formas de-
mocráticas que emergieron tras la revolución, y compararlas con el régimen dictatorial de Salazar. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Memoria colectiva; controversias sobre memorialización; Salazar; Estado Novo; Revolución 
del 25 de abril; revisionismo; políticas de la memoria
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I think that a crucial part of the interest in a compara-
tive analysis of the Portuguese (and, for that matter, the 
Spanish) process of coming to terms with a dictatorial 
past, which began with the democratization of the 1970s, 
lies mainly in the fact that it occurred while other Euro-
pean societies were confronted with a retour du refoulé, a 
third and fourth stage (Rousso, 1990) of the post-WWII 
remembrance of Nazism, Holocaust and collaboration. 
Clashes in the 1970s and 1980s over attempts to histori-
cize National-Socialism and the Holocaust – the West 
German 1986 Historikerstreit, although not only that – 
De Felice’s critique of the Italian anti-Fascist version of 
Fascism, controversy over French Holocaust negationism 
and revisionism, added to the nature of the Vichy regime 
and genocidal responsibilities were, broadly speaking, 
contemporary to the Portuguese Revolution (1974-76), 
Spanish democratic transition (1976-78) and the first 
stages of the Iberian democracies.
As with the European regimes that resulted from the 
Nazi and Fascist defeat in 1945, any comparative scheme 
which brings face to face the Portuguese revolutionary 
democratization model and others, like the Spanish, in 
which transition from dictatorship to democracy was 
based on a (series of) pact(s), should, presumably, find 
Portuguese public policies of memory of the authoritarian 
past designed to develop a democratic critique of dicta-
torship, in a context in which no agreement had been 
made or even negotiated between representatives of the 
authoritarian state and opposition movements. But this is 
not the case in Portugal, and it has almost never been so. 
To some, it may seem surprising that what emerges from 
the study of the social and political (re)constructions of 
the memory of the Portuguese 1926-74 dictatorship in the 
last four decades is that State policies on the matter drew 
a very similar picture to those countries in which transi-
tion was completely different (see Loff, 2014).
Very soon, as early as the last political clashes of 
1975, a sort of memory screen2 was created, especially 
amongst right-wing groups and those in Portuguese soci-
ety who describe themselves as victims of decoloniza-
tion, through which no public debate on the 1926-74 
years is allowed without being forced to discuss the 
1974-75 Revolution, as if both periods were historically 
or politically comparable, as if each of them had pro-
duced a historical global phenomenon which could legit-
imately be called a regime, and as if they both had com-
parable consequences in Portuguese society. For a 
significant part of society, and quite clearly for all its 
conservative elements, the Revolution on which democ-
racy had been built had opened the way – or rather coin-
cided with – for a Marxist/Communist/collectivist/totali-
tarian dictatorship worse than Salazar’s. As one of the 
top-ranking right-wing intellectuals, Vasco Graça Moura, 
summed it up on the 20th anniversary of the 25th of April 
1974, “Revolution did not instate freedom. It overthrew 
an authoritarian regime but tried to build up a totalitarian 
regime in its place”.3
It would be very interesting to place such arguments 
in parallel with those produced in other national cases in 
which the fall of authoritarian regimes allowed, in some 
cases for the first time in history, the sort of political and 
social changes in which the role of Communists and/or 
other left-wing radical forces was central. Those post-au-
thoritarian transitions of 1944-47 leading, if not to classic 
liberal-democratic regimes, at least to openly anti-Fascist 
political systems, were cycles of strong confrontation be-
tween those who gained their political legitimacy from 
resistance to dictatorship and those who represented the 
old order and their collaborators. Very soon, those who 
suffered the post-war French épuration or the Italian epu-
razione pushed forward a representation of the days 
around 1944 and 1945, as having been as violent and ar-
bitrary as Italian fascism or Vichy and the Occupation 
(See Cointet, 2008; Woller, 1997; Germinario, 1999), or, 
indeed, even more so.
In other words, in these narratives, one dictatorship 
followed another, as in post-war Poland, Czechoslovakia 
or East Germany, except, perhaps, that the Communists’ 
ban from power in France and Italy had prevented, as 
they would have it, further sovietization of these coun-
tries. The same is said of the sacking and imprisonment 
of Portuguese left-wing military in November 1975 and 
the definitive ban on Communists in government in the 
summer of 1976, after the fall of the last of the pre-consti-
tutional governments in which every major democratic 
party was represented.
Moving on in time, the complete picture is not as dif-
ferent as one might imagine from, for instance, the post-
Pinochet process of memory reconstruction in Chile in 
the early 1990s. In this case, the Armed Forces response 
to the Rettig Report (of the National Committee for Truth 
and Reconciliation, February 1991) submitted to Presi-
dent Aylwin was to describe its own attitude in the Sep-
tember 1973 coup as a preventive action to “prevent revo-
lutionary civil war in its larval form” (Chilean Army to 
National Security Council of Chile, quoted in Ensalaco, 
2002: 321) – very similar language, in fact, to that Franco 
always used to explain the July 18th, 1936 military upris-
ing against the Spanish Republican democratic govern-
ment, and, for that matter, the very crux of the neo-Fran-
coist thesis on the responsibilities of Socialists, Communists, 
Anarchists and Republicans in the 1936-39 Civil War, 
and thus in all Francoist repression.4
In all four cases (France, Italy, Chile, Spain), right-
wing memorial discourses (sometimes conveyed through 
historiography) use concepts like dictatorship and revolu-
tion to apply to brief, politically-intense stages, in which 
strong Communist parties were admitted for a period into 
large anti-Fascist government coalitions which included 
different political partners, who shared either a common 
opposition to a preceding dictatorial Fascist (Mussolini) 
or fascistized (Pétain) regimes, or to a radical progressive 
program (Allende’s Chile or Republican Spain) which 
stirred a violent right-wing reaction. In both these cases 
and in Portugal, in the debate over the memory of a long-
term (except in the short-term case of Vichy France) dic-
tatorial experience, discussion is pushed into the political 
nature of either previous historical experiences (Chilean 
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and Spanish cases) against which authoritarians have act-
ed, or the post-authoritarian transitional periods (French, 
Italian and Portuguese) which allowed societies to over-
come dictatorship.
REVOLUTION: AN EMANCIPATED MEMORY OF 
RESISTANCE, AN AMBIGUOUS MEMORY OF 
COLONIAL VIOLENCE
Almost overnight, the April 25th, 1974 military coup 
by the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças 
Armadas, MFA) became a revolutionary political break 
with the past and produced a wide political and institu-
tional elite replacement. Democracy is, in the Portu-
guese experience of the 1970s, a consequence of both a 
military coup and social revolution. The transitional 
process towards a fully institutionalized democracy 
would last until April 1976, when a new Constitution 
was passed. Those two years, or rather the 19 months 
leading up to November 1975, were the Portuguese 
Revolution. Unlike most other transitions from dictator-
ship to liberal-democratic regimes, especially all the re-
maining ones which Samuel Huntington (1991) equivo-
cally assembled in what he called a third wave of 
democratization, the Portuguese transitional model had 
all the right conditions to produce a clear rupture with 
the authoritarian past, politically as well as socially, 
economically and culturally. Left-wing political culture, 
in the post-1968 context, was becoming clearly predom-
inant in a society in which industrialization, war5 and 
massive emigration forced the Portuguese, especially 
young urban students and workers, to politicize their 
perception of the world (Loff, 2006).
That clear ideological hegemony of the Left was pre-
sent in the definition of the Estado Novo, the Portuguese 
dictatorship of 1926-74, considered a Fascist regime in 
every legal document passed in the first years of democ-
racy (including the 1976 Constitution). “Fascist repres-
sion” was the legal definition of the activity of the politi-
cal police (PIDE/DGS), and thus of the oppressive nature 
of Salazarism: “crimes systematically committed against 
the Portuguese people”, “arbitrary and inhumane action”, 
“terrorist activities” and “institutionalized crime”. Crimi-
nal procedure against those responsible for such crimes 
became “imprescriptible”6 – a legal principle which re-
mains formally effective, though in fact never evoked.
The military who, together with civilian leaders, ran 
the country until 1976, paid their own tribute to military 
victims of the dictatorship: General Humberto Delgado, a 
Salazarist dissident who became the opposition presiden-
tial candidate in 1958, trapped in Spain in 1965 and mur-
dered by the Portuguese political police, was posthu-
mously reintegrated into the Air Force in “public 
recognition of his virtues and valor”;7 and every “penalty 
imposed upon the military in view of the facts that oc-
curred during the invasion of the Portuguese State of In-
dia by the Indian armed forces in December 1961” were 
“nullified”. These military did not comply with Salazar’s 
orders to resist à outrance and were punished and ex-
pelled from the Army after being released by the Indians 
and sent back to Portugal.8
Social expression of memory of the victims of Sala-
zarist repression was intensely noticeable throughout the 
revolutionary period (1974-76), marking a first stage in 
the post-1974 process of remembering a the dictatorship. 
It was the moment when victims of repression could fi-
nally express their grievances, and the moment for those 
who wanted to listen to and honor them, despite the inevi-
table political competition between the different organi-
zations and their respective symbolic cultures.
Communist and, to a lesser extent, far-left militants 
(in the latest stage of the dictatorship) were necessarily 
recognized to have played an important role, since it was 
they who had suffered most at the hands of the political 
police (Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado, PIDE, 
renamed Direção-Geral de Segurança, DGS, in 1969) in 
Metropolitan Portugal. Edições Sociais, close to the Com-
munist Party (PCP), created a collection specifically dedi-
cated to the Episódios da Resistência Antifascista. Some 
Socialists and Republicans published their own resistance 
autobiographical accounts. Most of these memorial recol-
lections had already circulated underground during the 
1960s (see Ventura, 2001). A very special place was dedi-
cated to memory accounts of political prisoners (both 
Communists and Anarchists) who had survived the con-
centration camp of Tarrafal (1936-54) (see Brito, 2006). 
In 1978, 32 coffins were transferred from Tarrafal to Lis-
bon in what became probably the largest public tribute to 
anti-Fascist resistance members until early this century, 
when historical Communist leader Álvaro Cunhal’s fu-
neral in 2005 brought 250,000 people onto the streets of 
Lisbon.
Nevertheless, the military origin of the democratiza-
tion process remains one of the main sources of ambigui-
ty in the social and political elaboration of memory on the 
Colonial War. In fact, the military remained an inevitable 
central force in political and social life for some time. In 
this first stage of post-authoritarian remembrance, an im-
portant role was played by the massacres perpetrated by 
the military in the Colonial War, mostly in Mozambique, 
while colonial violence as a whole was fundamentally 
overlooked. In 1975-78, a number of underground publi-
cations produced in the last years of dictatorship, espe-
cially those prompted by progressive Catholic associa-
tions, were republished (Amaro, 1976, 1975a, 1975b, 
1978, 1977; Hastings, 1974; Stephan, 1975). Soon after 
the Revolution and until the early 1990s, State and media 
overlooked these events. In fact, in 1976, Ramalho Eanes, 
at that stage the Army’s General Chief-of-Staff, shortly 
before being elected President of the Republic, sued one 
of the publishers for “abuse of the freedom of the press”.9 
Articles on the massacres perpetrated against the popula-
tions of Northern Angola (1961)10 and Mozambique 
(1972)11 were to be published in 1992-94, making refer-
ence to the ex-combatants’ “culture of silence”,12 or to 
one of the most silenced features of Portuguese warfare, 
the use of napalm.13 But when a TV station picked up 
some of these stories, the spotlight no longer focused on 
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the African survivors but was turned on the Portuguese 
perpetrators instead. This is true of a 1998 documentary 
film on the massacre in Wiriyamu and other Mozambican 
villages (1972) (see Cabrita and Camacho, 1998a), and in 
the killings perpetrated by nationalists of the União das 
Populações de Angola (UPA) against Portuguese settlers 
in Northern Angola (March-April 1961). While, in 1991, 
reporter Felícia Cabrita had chosen to portray what she 
called the “days of rage” (reprisal massacres perpetrated 
by Portuguese settlers in Luanda, in February, and in the 
Dembos area, from March to June 1961) in the weekly 
newspaper Expresso, in 1998, another TV documentary 
displayed no interest in the African victims of the so-
called counter-massacres perpetrated by the Portuguese, 
but only in the settlers who had been victims of the UPA 
violence (see Cabrita and Camacho, 1998b). A single tes-
timony was collected on the settlers’ and military vio-
lence, and a final eluding reference is made to it: “In those 
early Colonial War times, ethical values were often for-
gotten. (...) Nothing would be the same as before”. Nine 
years later, the tone was clearly different in the widely 
celebrated documentary A Guerra: Colonial, do Ultra-
mar, de Libertação, produced by the public TV station, 
and Portuguese war crimes were finally clearly docu-
mented (Furtado, 2007).
After forty years of Portuguese democracy, it is still 
extremely hard to find any reference to Portuguese war 
crimes in any school history book, or on any education 
curriculum in any other form. From an official military 
standpoint, denial has been the rule. The first Portuguese 
right-wing government after 1974 appointed a Commis-
sion for the Study of African Campaigns (1961-1974),14 
headed by General Themudo Barata, instructing it to 
“collect systematically and thoroughly all documentation 
of potential historical and military interest” on the study 
of “the African Campaigns” (C.E.C.A., 1988: 16), delib-
erately avoiding the adjective colonial. Its publications 
would become the most substantial official version of the 
1961-74 war prepared by a Portuguese State agency. 
Their authors were conscious of dealing with the “memo-
ry of a significant part of our population”, which (accord-
ing to them) had suffered with “enormous intensity the 
emotional shock” of that “rare, even unique, metamor-
phosis in the life of any people”: “a country, on its own 
initiative and conscious of the risk impending over its 
own survival, being amputated, in a short one-and-half 
year period, of 95% of the territory under its sovereignty 
and for centuries integrated in its vital circuits”. For Bara-
ta, however, the “national identity crisis” had already 
“waned” in the 1980s, and “for a large majority of the 
Portuguese […] all that may seem now as a pale reminis-
cence” (C.E.C.A., 1988: 7-8). For this official committee, 
“overseas territories had always been considered parts of 
the Portuguese Fatherland”, and what they called a “uni-
tarian conviction of Portugal and the Portuguese” was so 
“compelling to the Portuguese people that its highest rep-
resentatives, in Government and in Parliament, have nev-
er dared, throughout History, to risk [or record] anything 
that goes against the unity of the Portuguese Nation, per-
ceived as pluri-continental, in the fundamental Laws of 
the Nation (...) [S]uch a conviction existed in the soul of 
the people and no one would dare to go against it” 
(C.E.C.A, 1990: 30-31) – an amazing statement by three 
high-ranking officers15 in the Army of a democratic State 
who had decided, fifteen years earlier, to “dare” to do ex-
actly what they now described as unthinkable.
An openly nationalistic and historically revisionist 
discourse pervades the five monographic volumes pro-
duced by the Commission, which seeks to map out a Por-
tuguese Sonderweg in History, as is usually the case in 
such discourses. Their core ideas on how to explain the 
Portuguese presence in Africa, the Colonial War, the fall 
of the regime and decolonization are fundamentally the 
same as post-WWII Salazarist literature and propaganda, 
produced in the context of the assimilationist final stage 
of Portuguese colonialism, depicting a non-colonialist 
and non-racist general context in which the “African 
campaigns” should be read. There was no Colonialism 
and no colonies but rather “Overseas Provinces” (Provín-
cias Ultramarinas) as, in fact, Salazar called them after 
the 1951 constitutional reform. There had been no racism 
but rather a “heterogeneous structure of the Portuguese 
population, amongst which those living in the African ter-
ritories have been included [sic] for centuries”, and “offi-
cial Portuguese policy” had “always” been to adapt legis-
lation “to [each colony’s] level of development [and] to 
respect values and culture of every human group and the 
conviviality tradition among all races”. The followers of 
“Pan-Africanism, by contrast, were racist, becoming 
Pan-Négritude [...] [, which] carried in itself a racist ge-
nus against the white people [and raised it] to a level un-
known in the Portuguese territories”. The Africans as well 
as the Portuguese supported the patriotic effort to fight 
the “terrorists”, only by a foreign elite, financed and mo-
bilized by foreign powers, was committed to “expel Por-
tugal straight out of its African territories” (C.E.C.A, 
1988: 58, 54, 122). In contrast, not a word was said of the 
massacres perpetrated by the Portuguese; nor of the 
250,000 young dodgers who escaped military service, 
20% of all those called up (see Afonso and Gomes, 2000); 
or of “the absence of African and mixed people in every 
important position, both in private and public sector of 
colonial society, [...] their insignificant representation in 
the upper level of the educational system [...], the unceas-
ing use of forced labor, expropriation of African land as a 
pervasive practice, arbitrary arrests and torture and even 
massacre of entire villages” (Bender, 1980: 11), as estab-
lished by historical research.
SILENCE, AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
DEVALUATION OF THE MEMORY OF 
RESISTANCE
As is commonplace, social reconstruction of memory 
followed social and political chronology. A second chron-
ological stage emerged at the end of the Revolution, in 
what became known (under the hegemonic political dis-
course produced since then) as democratic normalization. 
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After a complex and extremely intense political and so-
cial process, which developed between April 1974 and 
the end of November 1975, those who described them-
selves as the revolutionary Left (Communists and all 
movements of the far-Left: Maoists, Trotskyists, Progres-
sive Catholics), including a sizeable part of the military, 
were ousted from power by an amalgamated coalition of 
moderate Socialists, all right-wing parties, the Catholic 
Church hierarchy, and a barely compatible variety of mil-
itary officers, ranging from moderate left-wing to ultra-
right Neo-Salazarists, with international support from the 
USA and Western European governments. After the fall 
of the last of Vasco Gonçalves’ cabinets at the end of Au-
gust, this coalition prepared an almost bloodless military 
confrontation with a divided military Left on November 
15th, 1975, and prevailed.
By then, the Portuguese African colonies had finally 
been decolonized, during the extremely political hot sum-
mer16 and autumn of 1975, under complex Cold-War cir-
cumstances (South-African invasion of Angola with the 
help of a significant part of the Portuguese settlers’ elite, 
triggering both Cuban and US intervention), with a huge 
majority of the Portuguese settlers rejecting the power 
handover to the African liberation movements. Within a 
few years, Portugal opened the gates to half a million set-
tlers returning from Africa, plus almost 200,000 emi-
grants returning mainly from France and Germany, and 
100,000 servicemen returning from the colonies where 
they had been stationed until the formal surrender of 
power to the new African authorities. Parliamentary elec-
tions were held in April 1976, and were won by Soares’ 
Socialists,17 and General Ramalho Eanes, one of the mili-
tary commanders of the November 25th coup, was elected 
President in July, with the support of a wide coalition in-
cluding Socialists and the right-wing main parties (PPD 
and CDS). In December 1979, a right-wing coalition took 
power and for 16 consecutive years (1979-95), the main 
right-wing party – Popular Democratic (PPD), renamed 
Social-Democratic in 1976 – stayed in power, although it 
was pushed into a grand coalition led by the Socialists in 
1983-85. In 1982, a constitutional reform, voted by this 
same political bloc, put a definite end to the revolutionary 
cycle, ideologically redesigning the constitutional text 
and dissolving the last of the Revolution-legitimatized in-
stitutional bodies, the Conselho da Revolução, in charge, 
according to the original text of 1976, of constitutional 
supervision. Some of its members, especially those who 
were allies of the Socialist and right-wing forces in the 
process of defeating the radical Left in the final stage of 
the Revolution became critical of the Soares’ govern-
ments (1976-78), the executives appointed directly by 
President Eanes (1978-79) and the right-wing executives 
(1979-83) who had emerged in the meantime, and creat-
ed, in the same year, the Associação 25 de Abril, which 
made a formal commitment to “collect, preserve and pro-
cess informative and documentary material related to the 
History of the 25th of April and the historical process pre-
ceding and following it”. Paradoxically, in their effort to 
retrieve “the spirit of the liberating movement of April 
25th, 1974” (Art. 3 of the Statute of the Associação 25 de 
Abril), until the end of the 1980s, these military, virtually 
all in the reserve, found only their former opponents of 
1975 (Communists and the remains of the far-Left organ-
izations) with whom to celebrate the Revolution.
As literature suggests in a variety of other national 
cases involving post-authoritarian social expression of 
memory of oppression, the first two decades subsequent 
to the revolutionary period – i.e. until the early 1990s –
were a period of clear political and social devaluation of 
those who opposed and resisted the dictatorship, and con-
sequently of their commitment and their memory.
Showing a congenital sense of continuity with an un-
comfortable piece of the past (the Salazar era), it is rea-
sonable to say that Portuguese right-wing leaders (but not 
intellectuals or military of the same political area) pre-
ferred, at least until the early years of the 21st century, to 
remain silent over the dictatorship and the Colonial War 
which brought the Estado Novo to an end. The whole cul-
tural and social ambiance of the years following the end 
of the 1974-75 Revolution – recession, decolonization, 
the rise of a post-industrial society and the structural 
problems of an economy undergoing a severe process of 
adaptation following the end of a corporative-controlled 
economy, and the end of an authoritarian modernization 
process – allowed economic and political elites (in this 
case, both Socialist and right-wing) to put almost unani-
mous blame on the irresponsible hazards of the Revolu-
tion for the economic troubles. In fact, as often happens 
in post-authoritarian societies, memory of recent political 
confrontation (revolution and decolonization in the Portu-
guese case) gained precedence over the memory of events 
that had occurred 15 (Colonial War and massive emigra-
tion), 30 (massive disillusionment at the fraud against 
Delgado in the 1958 presidential election) or 50 years 
earlier (severe repression in the early years of Salazar’s 
rule). This whole picture gave Portuguese conservatives 
the opportunity to impose a politically-motivated discus-
sion on the negative legacy of the 19-month Revolution, 
rather than discussing the 48 years of the Estado Novo, at 
least whenever it became impossible to elude the debate 
on Salazar, Caetano, political police, repression, corporat-
ism or war in Africa.
A memory screen had been successfully imposed: no 
public debate on the 1926-74 years was now possible 
without a parallel discussion of the 1974-75 Revolution, 
as if both periods were historically or politically compa-
rable. But were they? By the end of the 1970s, those po-
litical forces who had access to power were already 
avoiding discussion of Salazar, Caetano and their re-
gimes, usually in the name of reconciliation: for Social-
ists – committed to a moderate discourse, both inside 
government (1976-78, 1983-85) or in opposition to the 
right-wing administrations (1979-83, 1985-95) – cele-
brating the Revolution and elaborating on the memory of 
the dictatorship had become almost too much of a radical-
left approach; for the right-wing parties – to some extent 
representing second and third generations of families 
connected with the Estado Novo, and who electorally rep-
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resented conservative social groups who kept and repro-
duced an essentially positive memory of Salazar and 
Caetano years – this whole debate was embarrassing and 
considered uninteresting and unhelpful in the pursuit of 
economic development. Accordingly, historical legacy of 
what was an elite consensus over Salazar and over his po-
litical paradigm still plays a central role today in the obvi-
ous ambiguity shown by Portugal’s upper-classes towards 
the memory of the dictatorship and to their own course of 
action throughout the last 15 years of the regime. Obvi-
ous continuity (family ties, class sociability) of a very 
significant part of pre- and post-1974 social, economic 
and cultural elites – in fact, a widespread phenomenon of 
post-dictatorial societies – is a relevant factor to consider 
when assessing discourse on the dictatorship years pro-
duced in the upper-classes, not only among those who 
feel close to the ideological nature of the elapsed regime, 
but more importantly of those who, although hostile to it, 
tend to exonerate their own relatives or next of kin – 
mostly from their own social class – from the negative 
core of past experience. It is interesting to see how, a few 
years ago, after two decades leading the CDS (the more 
conservative and elitist of Portugal’s two major right-
wing parties), Diogo Freitas do Amaral, an exceptional 
case among Portuguese conservative leaders,18 com-
plained about the intolerance of the Portuguese right-
wing forces regarding the memory of Salazar and his re-
gime, by stating that they seemed to think it “unbearable 
that someone supposedly right-wing”, like himself, 
should “criticize that regime or that era” in Portuguese 
history. Amaral said he had “been convinced, but now I 
think I was wrong, that a huge majority of the Portuguese 
Right was, or had become, sincerely, a democratic 
Right”.19
The 10th anniversary of the Revolution, in 1984, oc-
curred during the worst moment of economic crisis after 
the fall of the dictatorship. A negative perception of the 
Revolution and of the democratic system built upon it 
apparently concealed negative memories of Salazar’s re-
gime. In a survey20 produced that year, no more than a 
third of the respondents thought the 25 April Revolution 
had “improved my personal fulfilment” and around a 
fifth that it had “improved my economic situation”; only 
22.5% thought the Revolution had been “positive” for 
“economic development”, 24.5% for “social stability” 
and 26.4% for “youth prospects”. Ten years later, posi-
tive answers to these questions rose to 67.3%, 56.2%, 
73.6%, 65.1% and 55.3% respectively. In 1984, a perva-
sive negative perception of the revolutionary legacy 
overlooked all actual data on how democracy had evi-
dently improved mass education: no more than 33.4% of 
the respondents thought the revolutionary legacy on “ac-
cess to education” was good; again, ten years later that 
figure more than doubled. As is frequently detectable in 
post-authoritarian societies, social and political libera-
tion was associated with a negative assessment of “pub-
lic morality” (to 49.7% of those polled in 1984, to 45.9% 
in 1994) and what was perceived as “crime expansion” 
(66.4% and 76.4%) and “drug influence [on society]” 
(73.4% and 84%). In 1984, after decolonization but be-
fore integration in the European Community (1986), no 
more than 35.2% thought the Revolution had had a “pos-
itive effect” on Portuguese “political independence” and 
only 15.4% on “economic independence”; by contrast, 
ten years later, and after eight years of having adhering 
to the potentially federal project of the EC/EU, positive 
answers to these questions had increased to 62.7% and 
55%, respectively.
Ten years after the fall of the dictatorship, “freedom” 
seemed to be the only topic where a relatively positive 
consensus had been preserved about the revolutionary 
consensus: 82.5% of the respondents (88.4% in 1994) 
thought the April 25th uprising had had a “positive ef-
fect” regarding “freedom of speech” and 54.8% (71.8% 
in 1994) as far as “youth freedom” was concerned. Apart 
from these, only “Portugal’s image in the world” was 
positively perceived as the result of the democratic Revo-
lution by half (49.2%) of the respondents in 1984 (82.2% 
in 1994).
In fact, this whole process of apparent collective dis-
appointment with the democratic Revolution, brought 
about by swiftly decreasing interest in political participa-
tion and the pervasive realization of strong structural ob-
stacles to economic development, seem to have produced 
a relatively coherent new set of values adopted by a solid 
majority of the Portuguese, mainly reflected in the signifi-
cant change in political trends which led to two landslide 
victories (1987 and 1991) for Aníbal Cavaco Silva, the 
new liberal-conservative leader of PSD and prime minis-
ter from 1985 to 1995. A shy authoritarian Economics 
professor, he posed, like Salazar before him, as an apoliti-
cal politician. In the early 1990s, Cavaco felt able to state 
that July 19th, 1987 (his first landslide) was “the most im-
portant date in recent Portuguese history”, obviously im-
plying that the April 25th, 1974 was not. In 1990, Portugal 
was included for the first time in the European Value 
Study created by Ronald Inglehart. This comparative sur-
vey showed the Portuguese as being, by far, the most 
“materialistic” society of any that had been studied: 
around 40% of the respondents (doubling European aver-
age) tended to subscribe to “materialistic” values such as 
giving priority to “keeping order in the country” and 
“fighting inflation” as national “goals for the next ten 
years”, instead of “post-materialistic” values such as “as-
suring citizens more capacity to participate in important 
Government decisions” or “defending freedom of expres-
sion” (12%, less than half the European average) (see 
Freire, 2003).
Furthermore, it may prove significant that some per-
ceived those ten consecutive years (1985-95) in which 
Portugal was led by Cavaco Silva’s administration, 
known today as the Cavaquismo, as a kind of democrati-
zation of Marcelo Caetano’s authoritarian modernizing 
project for Portugal.21 It is striking, in this respect, that a 
significant number of Caetano’s collaborators, or those 
appointed by him to relevant posts in government, re-
turned to political and economic power in the 
mid-1980s.22
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1989-94: REVISIONIST CLIMAX AND THE 
REBELLION OF ANTIFASCIST MEMORY
When the Berlin Wall fell and real socialism col-
lapsed in 1989, the attitude of leading right-wing stake-
holders (in politics, the media, university and corpora-
tions) towards the past was apparently majoritarian: why 
discuss and research the dictatorship when the Revolu-
tion was to blame for what was wrong with Portugal? 
Thirteen years after the end of revolutionary expectations 
– or disillusionment – mostly under right-wing govern-
ments, social and cultural atmosphere was ripe for the 
confrontation that occurred between opposing memorial 
discourses and policies. Social sciences were already pro-
ducing solid works on most of Salazar’s regime dimen-
sions, but that did not, obviously, prevent what may be 
taken as prototypical revisionist controversy. It then be-
came commonplace to produce memorial accounts on the 
dictatorship into which were squeezed highly negative 
references to the Revolution of 1974-76, thus producing a 
historically-confusing discourse, often clearly anachro-
nistic. Academic mainstream discourse had already 
evolved from a 1960s and 70s Fascist-categorization of 
Salazar’s Estado Novo (O Fascismo em Portugal, 1982) 
towards an authoritarian, non-totalitarian and non-Fascist 
perception (O Estado Novo das origens ao fim da autar-
cia, 1987; Cruz, 1988), always predominant in Anglo-
Saxon universities, especially in the USA, which had 
never abandoned the authoritarian classification of the 
Portuguese benevolent dictatorship.23 This was at the core 
of the first memorial controversies, with neo-Salazarist 
and liberal-conservative historians and intellectuals, all 
subscribing to the totalitarian theory precept, denying any 
similarity between the Estado Novo and Italian and Ger-
man fascism and reproducing for the Portuguese case De 
Felice’s assumption that definition of Italian fascism until 
the 1970s would have been imposed by Antifascists. Af-
ter some theoretical/historiographical essays produced in 
the 1960s by exiled activists (including Communist lead-
er Álvaro Cunhal’s Rumo à Vitória) or scholars who went 
abroad, not before the late 1980s was there solid historio-
graphical research assessing the fascist characteristic and 
matrix of Salazar’s regime in the 1930s and 40s and re-
jecting what was by then, a majoritarian authoritarian 
monochromatic interpretation, disregarding violence, 
massive repression and mass organizations.24 A small 
group among the dictator’s inner circle developed a neo-
Salazarist discourse with some important editorial suc-
cess. Biographer Franco Nogueira, former minister for 
Foreign Affairs (1961-69), described the Estado Novo as 
a “passive State, according to liberal models”, as opposed 
to “a totalitarian State, according to Communist, Fascist 
or Nazi models”.25 For two monarchist Law professors in 
1989, Salazar’s regime was an attempt to “reconcile (...) 
an authoritarian political practice with formulae inherited 
from 19th-century liberalism”. Only the “vileness, stupid-
ity and dishonesty projected on to the character [Salazar] 
and his work”, together with a “hard silence, orchestrated 
by today’s powerful men and opinion-makers”, could ex-
plain the “ingratitude” towards Salazar, although they 
perceived already that it was “starting to be reintegrated 
in national memory” (Henriques and Melo, 1989: 10-
11).26 In 1991, the Ministry of Education27 adopted the 
authoritarian/benevolent thesis on the Estado Novo, and 
until the mid-1990s’ memorial controversy, silence over 
the Colonial War and police violence became common 
practice in most Portuguese elementary and secondary 
schools (Silva, 2006), while the first postgraduate History 
program on the dictatorship opened only in 1989 at the 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Until the 25th anniversary 
of the democratic Revolution, in 1999, both right-wing 
and center-left governments stuck to the generous Revo-
lution leitmotif, following the strategy adopted by most 
Western European governments all throughout the Cold 
War about Nazi occupation and WWII civil wars, assum-
ing an institutional discourse on the need to wipe out bad 
memories and urging to look to the future and “forget 
what divided us in the past”... A clear institutional repre-
sentation of such policies was the fact that until 1996, Ca-
vaco Silva’s government hindered legislation which im-
posed open access to the most relevant archives of the 
dictatorship: Salazar’s personal and political archives, as 
well as those of the political police (PIDE/DGS). When 
they were eventually opened to researchers and to every-
one who had been persecuted or kept under surveillance, 
influential sociologist, António Barreto, unsuccessfully 
proposed their dismantling by suggesting the return of 
documents on three million people to those affected or 
their descendants.28 The mobilization of historians and 
other researchers prevented what would have meant the 
elimination of this vital evidence on the intrinsic nature of 
the dictatorship.
The year 1989 also marked the 100th anniversary of 
Salazar’s birth, offering one of the few opportunities to 
seize a fairly official view of Portuguese right-wing politi-
cal leaders on Salazar and his regime. Freitas do Amaral 
referred to his “authoritarianism, intolerance, coldness, 
toughness with his opponents […], personal seclusion, in-
capacity for dialogue, mistrust in Portuguese maturity, 
aversion to individual liberties”, but highlighted his “intel-
ligence, culture, […] personal honesty, devotion to public 
interest, willpower, love of Portugal, capacity for govern-
ment, sense of State, independence from (...) groups of in-
terest, foreign powers”, his “ability to conceive a global 
political project and of executing it step by step”. While 
PM Cavaco Silva avoided any comment at all, one of his 
ministers, Dias Loureiro, praised Salazar’s “expertise” in 
enabling “Portugal to emerge from [the Spanish Civil War 
and WWII] paying the lowest cost possible” and the 
“highly positive” financial policy of the early part of his 
rule. For Loureiro, as for most right-wingers, it was only 
“after 1945” that Salazar seemed to have “lost touch with 
a modern world vision”, “placing Portugal outside Euro-
pean recovery dynamics, losing an ideal chance to start 
industrialization”, thus suggesting the fascist years (1930s 
and WWII) to be Salazar’s finest hour. The “Colonial 
War”—an expression rarely used in right-wing discourses 
on Salazarism—was harmful to Portuguese society, not so 
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much for being an unacceptable deliberate policy of the 
regime, but because it “further compromised Portuguese 
[economic] development”. Loureiro acknowledged “re-
strictions imposed on freedom of speech and on freedom 
of political activity, the absence of a democratic organiza-
tion of society produced, in fact, economic, cultural and 
scientific stagnation, delaying [Portuguese accession to] 
modernity”. But, in other words, authoritarianism and dic-
tatorship had not been intrinsically bad as such, but had 
merely an instrumentally negative impact on economic 
and cultural “development”, and on the process of achiev-
ing “modernity”.29
In contrast, on the left, Socialist leader (and future 
President of the Republic, 1996-2006) Jorge Sampaio, a 
student activist in the early 1960s, shared the Left’s view 
that “the Estado Novo was the Portuguese variety, in the 
specific conditions of Portuguese society and in the con-
text of its genesis (…), of the wave of authoritarian and 
fascist regimes that swept Europe between the end of 
WWI and the end of WWII”, pointing to the “single par-
ty”, “corporatism”, “censorship”, “repression and politi-
cal police as instruments to coerce Portuguese citizens’ 
thought and action”, “manipulation of public opinion 
through propaganda” as its core characteristics. But 
Sampaio, like Loureiro, underlined the “productive and 
technological underdevelopment, dependence on Gov-
ernment protectionism on taxation and from political 
protest, (…) obsolete industrial and productive organiza-
tions”, the kind of “obstructions which persist in Portu-
guese society” that had been “originated and consolidat-
ed” by Salazar’s policies. For Dias Lourenço, an 
old-guard Communist resistance member, Salazar “em-
bodied, in Portugal, the answer provided by the most re-
actionary forces of those years to the unsolvable contra-
dictions and conflicts of the first quarter of the 20th 
century”. His main concern was to point out to “certain 
‘historians’ and ‘biographers’ who try, under the curtain 
of Portuguese ‘smooth traditions’, to elude the inhumane 
nature of Salazarist Fascism and to prudishly silence 
death by torture in police dungeons and cold-blooded ex-
ecutions, on the streets, of dozens of patriots, an ‘impris-
oned country’, violent suffocation of freedom and cul-
ture”, calling on them to “record [these crimes and the 
violent repression] as Salazar’s work”. According to 
Lourenço, by then editor of the Communist weekly 
Avante, “a significant part of this chapter remains to be 
written in Portuguese historiography”.30
The first widespread public debate over the Portu-
guese dictatorship took place three years later. In April 
1992, it became public that the Government was granting 
pensions to former PIDE inspectors for “exceptional and 
relevant services rendered to the country”, while the same 
pension had been denied in 1988 to Salgueiro Maia, one 
of the young captains who led the military operations in 
April 1974 and who had died a few days earlier (April 4th, 
1992). To add to the controversy, pensions and honors 
were granted because of “exceptional and relevant deeds 
on behalf of the Motherland” (Decree No. 404/82, 
24.9.1982) during the war in Africa which were appar-
ently clearly more relevant than the military operations to 
overthrow the authoritarian government. Left-wing intel-
lectuals and activists – bringing together, perhaps for the 
first time, Socialists (starting with President Mário 
Soares), Communists and small far-Left parties – protest-
ed strongly, describing the political culture of the right-
wing government as sheer whitewashing31 of the dictator-
ship. This was merely the first stage in a wider and 
tougher dispute which would reach its apex in 1994, on 
the Revolution’s 20th anniversary. As Luciana Soutelo 
pointed out, “the legal action of granting [those] pensions 
to former” torturers, “especially because of the fact that 
these men had played that role, does not differ significant-
ly from the historical interpretations designed to rehabili-
tate the Estado Novo and, at the same time, to diminish 
the meaning and consequences of April 25th”. (Soutelo, 
2009: 263).
A peak in this process was reached in 1994, when a 
commercial TV station SIC invited one of those political 
police officers (Óscar Cardoso) to a debate on the dicta-
torship and the Revolution, together with a historian (José 
Manuel Tengarrinha) who had been a political prisoner, 
and a former member of the Conselho da Revolução 
(Sousa e Castro). Cardoso had been notorious for his ac-
tions of extreme violence in Angola and Mozambique 
during the Colonial War, but SIC’s editor Emídio Rangel 
gave him an opportunity to convey a positively negation-
istic discourse on the dictatorship political police, focus-
ing on what he presumed had been its main characteris-
tics: “ethics”, “patriotism”, “scientificity”, “effectiveness” 
or the “gentleness” of its agents. The former inspector, 
systematically addressed as such by an especially kind 
moderator, who deliberately avoided embarrassing ques-
tions, was impudent enough to deny that torture and exe-
cutions had been practiced by the political police until 
1974. Meanwhile, both the anti-Salazarist resistance 
member and the MFA military were unable to respond to 
Cardoso’s strategy.
Strong-worded reactions came from anti-Salazarist 
resistants. For President Mário Soares, “it was as if 
[Klaus] Barbie – the butcher of Marseille – had been in-
vited to a debate with his own victims”.32 “What are we 
going to tell our children after they have watched this de-
bate on TV? That we have imagined this whole story? 
What on earth will be our legacy?” asked editor Torcato 
Sepúlveda in what was one of the first texts ever pub-
lished in the press on Portuguese revisionism.33 In fact, in 
the Portuguese debate on the political use of History, con-
cepts such as negationism or revisionism had hardly been 
used until then; contrast and correlation with other Euro-
pean controversies on 20th-century regimes would not be 
considered of any significance until early in the 21st cen-
tury (Loff, 1996). On the eve of the 20th anniversary of 
the Revolution, at last, hundreds of signatories made pub-
lic a manifesto against the “impudent campaign of white-
washing the previous regime, its agents and its practices, 
reaching a media peak on the 20th anniversary of the April 
25th celebrations. By means of the undervaluation and de-
liberate mystification of History, and by airing the opin-
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ions, with no adequate critique, of some of its representa-
tives, there is an attempt to cleanse crimes committed by 
the dictatorship and to retrieve its ideology. [...] And be-
cause we do not forget, we also do not consent, through 
perverting historical reality, to the wiping out of the 
memory of those who have sacrificed themselves to the 
fight for democracy”.34 It was nevertheless quite likely 
that, among them, were a number of those who, in 1974-
76, thought it best to “turn the page of past crimes”, prob-
ably not believing that, at some point, something close to 
historical “whitewashing” and “mystification” would en-
joy such media support.
Very few right-wing intellectuals decided to take part 
in the 1994 debate. For a short while, but for the first time 
since 1976, they felt comparatively uneasy. Some, how-
ever, went straight to the same old point: if Salazar’s dic-
tatorship was bad, the Revolution was worse. Like Vasco 
Graça Moura. He reacted quite bluntly to those “who de-
cided to recall in the media a whole series of PIDE crimes 
which is convenient not to forget”, but, he stressed, “no-
body recalled the arbitrary arrests, censorship, intimida-
tion, tipping off, manipulation, slander, death threats, tor-
ture and injuries”, as well as – and the mixing up of these 
is politically quite relevant – ”squatting in properties, 
purges, destruction and other post-April 25th savagery. It 
was not PIDE who did those. It was the MFA-PCP alli-
ance of rejuvenating memory, that true spittle [sic] on our 
country’s democratization process”.35
While philosopher José Gil had already argued that 
the whole debate on political police repression, 20 years 
after the fall of the regime which had created it, meant 
that the Portuguese were somehow “[retrieving the] 
memory of what did not exist (because it was not said, 
because it happened only as a non-event)”,36 Moura was 
sure that “Portugal hasn’t yet assimilated its own bad 
conscience for having been the only country in history” –
no less –”whose armed forces”, as he would have it, 
“were uniquely fearless in handing over everything they 
wanted on a plate, without even being defeated”. Thus, 
Moura chose to drag decolonization into the debate, that 
specific feature of social memory regarding the fall of the 
authoritarian regime and the Revolution which continued, 
over the years, to be negatively perceived by a majority 
of the Portuguese, both until and after 1989. For Moura, 
the young April captains “preferred, for patriotic reasons, 
a corporative insubordination of wages and promotions, a 
preference that was inspired by Soviet motivations and 
that was almost completely fulfilled. They preferred, he-
roically, to abandon to their fate [in Angola and Mozam-
bique] millions and millions of people who, in the mean-
time, died in one of most terrifying catastrophes in the 
history of mankind and whose responsibility is all 
theirs”.37
At the same time, a self-portrait was emerging of the 
Portuguese as the victims of the war: the former combat-
ants, towards whom both society and State had not been 
as morally appreciative and as legally fair as they felt 
they were entitled;38 the retornados (the Portuguese 
equivalent to the French pieds noirs), settlers and Afri-
cans who chose to return/come to Portugal, self-portrayed 
as victims of decolonization, of the Revolution, of the lib-
eration movements in Africa, but who hardly felt victims 
of colonialism and the dictatorship. Self-victimization 
impelled them to talk about their own experience, openly 
asking State and society to empathize with their feelings 
and their pain, as well as their legal demands. The per-
vading lack of determination of most of the new African 
States (except perhaps Mozambique) in developing spe-
cific memorial policies on the war from an African per-
spective left room for Portuguese-centered memorial pol-
icies conveyed by the Portuguese Armed Forces and 
former associations of combatants and retornados.39
In fact, all those who subscribe to the narrative of the 
amputated Nation operate inside a widespread consensus 
on a sort of culturalistic self-indulgent explanation, the 
Lusotropicalism, committed to proving a special capacity 
for cultural assimilationism, an alleged multi-racialism 
and the absence of racial prejudice, a supposedly fatherly 
attitude of Portuguese colonists. In 2001, José Leitão, 
first High-Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Mi-
norities, under a Socialist administration, forced to re-
spond to reparation demands from some African states 
and Afro-descendants’ organizations in that year’s UN 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xen-
ophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance (Durban), 
stated that “it is not legitimate to demand official excuses 
from a country which decolonized, who made itself re-
sponsible for its past faults, and which has created a rela-
tionship based on solidarity with the Portuguese-speaking 
African countries”.40 In fact, Portuguese governments 
have overlooked, and often denied, the African human 
tragedy, never investigating or publicizing any figures on 
the African victims of colonial repression and the 1961-
74 war, do not recognize any war crimes (according to 
national or international Law: massacres, torture and kill-
ing of prisoners, chemical warfare...), and have never dis-
cussed any financial reparation with its five former Afri-
can colonies, India or East-Timor.
THE 21st CENTURY: AN OPEN BATTLE FOR 
MEMORY
Meanwhile, in academia, there was a highly signifi-
cant change in attitude towards historical research on the 
1926-74 period. Indeed, research on these subjects have 
been booming since the late 1990s, as have fiction, auto-
biography and film (both fictional and documentary). On 
the one hand, solid works have been produced on Sala-
zarist repression and violence, especially on the role of 
the political police, and including, at long last, some of 
its colonial dimensions (see Mateus, 2004; Pimentel, 
2007); on the other, as in several other national cases, a 
kind of nostalgic literature on the two dictators (Salazar, 
1928-68, and Marcelo Caetano, 1968-74), both bio-
graphical and pseudo-historiographical, as well as on 
their families and friends, former ministers and so forth, 
have flooded bookstores and the media, usually written 
by reporters, but also by certain trendy right-wing histo-
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rians whose work was especially welcomed by publish-
ing houses. A clear symptom of this sort of approach to 
history and collective memory was the TV contest 
Grandes Portugueses, broadcast over several months 
throughout autumn 2006 and winter 2007 by RTP, the 
public broadcasting company, which imported it from 
the BBC. RTP had presented it as “good-humored enter-
tainment (...) combining Documentary and Show Busi-
ness [Grande Espetáculo]. It’s a true challenge to the 
Nation and, at the same time, an excellent moment for a 
lively debate among the Portuguese on their History”.41 
To give the contest a pedagogical angle, RTP organized a 
Road-Show to take the debate into several elementary 
and secondary schools in the country. On the other hand, 
the TV station decided to appoint a defender (defensor) 
for the ten characters with most votes in a bizarre first 
stage to the contest. These included Salazar, defended by 
far-right researcher Jaime Nogueira Pinto, and Álvaro 
Cunhal, the former Communist leader, defended by 
Communist MP Odete Santos. In the last 40 years, it is 
hard to find a better example addressing the history of 
the recent past under the extreme conditions imposed by 
the new media-oriented, technological mass culture, es-
pecially with such pedagogical pretensions, which used 
highly simplistic, virtually acritical procedures, to con-
vey a memorial discourse presented as if it were a collec-
tive national memory. After six months, Salazar had won 
the contest. Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, author of an ac-
claimed Political Biography of Salazar, in which he 
complained about the long-term predominance in “Por-
tuguese historiography” of “Marxist and Annales’ mod-
els – an obviously overrated assessment of the actual his-
tory of History departments in Portuguese universities, 
even if we only consider the democratic period – accord-
ed the show sufficient relevance and credibility to per-
ceive in “Salazar’s victory”, a “detectable change of atti-
tude in Portugal towards the recent past” (Meneses, 
2009: 12-14).
However, the media became significantly more atten-
tive to scientific research when full access to archives 
since the mid-1990s began to have an effect. But instead 
of building a general consensus on these aspects and 
helping to appease political quarrels over history, archival 
work which unveiled the repression, corruption and ma-
nipulation of Salazar’s regime, the authoritarian nature of 
the postwar modernisation process, produced harsher and 
more visible clashes between academics: in August 2012, 
a sort of Portuguese Historikerstreit erupted when I 
strongly criticized an openly revisionist and negationist 
essay by monarchist historian Rui Ramos on Portuguese 
20th-century history when the weekly Expresso decided to 
include it free for all its readers throughout the summer of 
2012, after six consecutive editions of the book had al-
ready sold out.42 Controversy raged for four months, 
bringing most 20th-century historians, some sociologists 
and political scientists, into the debate, proving how in-
tense confrontation in this field of action remains.43
The open and outspoken battle for memory of the last 
ten years has helped consolidate the anti-Fascist memory 
of the dictatorship, but also of the Revolution, in an overt 
confrontation with the progression of the revisionist dis-
course of conservative historiography, especially during 
the decade of Cavaco’s right-wing administration. As far 
as the right-wing memorial policies are concerned, how-
ever, what became visible in the 21st century is, more than 
internal dissonance, a true division of labor: political 
stakeholder on the right, especially when in government, 
tend to adopt the same strategy as Spanish post-Fran-
coists, at least until Aznar came to power in 1996: to re-
main silent on the authoritarian past, to describe collec-
tive memory as a matter for family and individual privacy, 
to approach debates on the matter with apparent lack of 
interest and indifference, treating them as unhelpful in 
building the future; on the other hand, the attacks by 
right-wing intellectuals and academics on the revolution-
ary heritage of 1974-75 – as well as that of 1910 (the Por-
tuguese Republic) and, to some extent, of the 1820 Lib-
eral Revolution – has grown increasingly aggressive, 
literally importing international revisionism criteria and 
arguments, retrieving the politics of memory of the 1980s 
and early 1990s. All in all, revisionist views of the Revo-
lution and the decolonization process still have a strong 
impact on public opinion, but they have lost the hegemo-
ny they seemed to have enjoyed in the mid-1990s, espe-
cially because, since the rebellion of memory of 1994, 
they have been openly disputed. Consequently, on the 
two major anniversaries of April 25th, 1974 in this new 
century (the 30th in 2004 and the 40th in 2014), right-wing 
governments, in power on both occasions, have made an 
obvious effort to produce a sort of normalized version of 
the Revolution (as in the 2004 slogan of April is evolu-
tion/Abril é evolução), eliminating all its radical signifi-
cance. Ten years later, at the very recent 40th anniversary, 
celebrated under the worse social and economic recession 
since 1984, ruling right-wing parties and neoconservative 
intellectuals chose to play down (albeit temporarily) their 
revisionist stance in the face of a widespread revival of 
revolutionary symbols (songs like Grândola, Vila More-
na or Fernando Lopes Graça’s and José Gomes Ferreira’s 
resistance Heróicas songs of 1946, the 1970s slogans of 
the O povo unido jamais será vencido, …) in rallies and 
other forms of protest. For quite a number of Portuguese, 
the 1974 Revolution is apparently still a source of politi-
cal inspiration, enough to force presidential historical 
consultant David Justino to ask for “Revolution values to 
be used to project the future, instead of looking around to 
find today signs identical to those we lived with before 
1974”.44
A symbolic struggle, however, still continues among 
different memory discourses disputing hegemony on the 
process of rebuilding the past. The nature of the visibility 
of each memory discourse creates a specific balance be-
tween the forces operating in this battle over memory. 
Memorial policies play a central role in the struggle for 
ideological and symbolical hegemony, in the construction 
of the terms of perception and organization of social real-
ity: people either remember to preserve or they remember 
to change.
Culture & History Digital Journal 3(2), December 2014, e017. eISSN 2253-797X, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2014.017
Dictatorship and revolution: Socio-political reconstructions of collective memory in post-authoritarian Portugal • 11
NOTES
 1. Manuel Loff is Principal Researcher in the project Estado e 
memória: políticas públicas da memória da ditadura portugue-
sa (1974-2009) (PTDC/HIS-HIS/121001/2010).
 2. Henry Rousso talks about the French Libération as a “souvenir 
écran” which pushes backwards the memories of the French 
1940 defeat and the German Occupation (Le syndrôme de 
Vichy...).
 3. Moura, Vasco Graça, Diário de Notícias [DN] “Portugal e o 
passado”, 10 April 1994.
 4. For the revisionist anti-republican standpoint, Moa (1999) sure-
ly remains the most representative example.
 5. In February and March 1961, nationalist rebellions in Angola 
started a Colonial War (1961-74) which soon spread to Guinea-
Bissau (1963) and Mozambique (1964). A total of 920,000 Por-
tuguese soldiers were drafted, 10,000 killed, 30,000 wounded, 
an estimate of over 100,000 returned from war with Post-Trau-
matic Stress Disorder.
 6. Law No. 8/75, 25.7.1975, passed by the Council of the Revolu-
tion (Conselho da Revolução, created in March 1975, repre-
senting every rank, through delegate election within the Armed 
Forces). On transitional justice in the years following the Revo-
lution, see Pimentel et al. (2013).
 7. Decree No. 647/74, 21 November 1974.
 8. Decree No. 727/74, 19 December 1974. The new Provisional 
Government recognized Indian sovereignty over Goa, Daman 
and Diu on 31 December 1974.
 9. See Expresso-Revista [EV] “A mentira oficial”, 5 December 
1992.
10. Cabrita, Felícia [EV] “África: os dias da raiva”, 16 March 
1991: 6-15, including pieces by José Manuel Saraiva and 
António Costa Santos.
11. Cabrita, Felícia and Azevedo, Clara [EV] “Os mortos não sof-
rem”, 5 December 1992: 12-21.
12. Reis, Patrícia [EV] “Recordações de África”, 22 January 1994: 
24-31.
13. Carvalho, Frederico [EV] “A guerra do fogo”, 26 March 1994: 
24-29.
14.. See Portaria No 43/80, 16 February 1980.
15.. This specific volume was written by Generals João I.N. Egreja 
and Manuel S. Menezes, and Brigadier Orlando R. da Costa.
16.. The expression Verão quente is currently used to describe that 
period of political and social confrontation.
17. PS: 34.9% of the votes; PPD: 24.4%; CDS: 16%; PCP: 14.4%; 
far-Left parties: 4.4%; far-Right parties: 1.1%.
18. Diogo Freitas do Amaral (b. 1941) was one of the youngest 
members of the dictatorship’s second chamber (Câmara Corpo-
rativa) in the late years of Marcelo Caetano’s rule, and became 
the founding leader of CDS (Christian-Democrats) in 1974-82 
and 1987-91. He was elected President of the UN General As-
sembly in 1994, and minister for Foreign Affairs in 2005-06.
19. See Notícias Magazine, 9 March 2003.
20. See Visão [Vis] “Sondagem. 25 de Abril? Claro que sim!”, 21 
April 1994.
21. A “democratised Marcelism”, an “authoritarian reformism”, a 
“search for an enduring hegemony of power and its identifica-
tion with the new political class and the nouveau-riches, in a 
wide populist and clientele-based perspective, supported by the 
old myth of Portuguese Sebastianist right-wing: the ‘providen-
tial man’” (Franco, 1993: 258). Sebastianism refers to messianic 
myth on young King Sebastian who disappeared in 1578, at 24, 
in a disastrous northern Morocco military campaign, retrieved 
by nationalist intellectuals of the 19th and 20th centuries.
22. See Loff (2009: 79); Castanheira, João Pedro, and Marcelino, 
Valentina [EV] “Os homens de Marcello: onde estão e o que 
fazem”, 24 April 1993: 22-29.
23. See for the 1970s Graham, 1975; Wheeler, 1983; Schmitter, 
1980. 
24. See some of the early Fernando Rosas’ works (1988, 1989ª; 
1989b). For an authoritarian non-fascist interpretation of the 
Estado Novo, see Manuel Braga da Cruz, João Medina, Hipólito 
de la Torre, António Telo, António Costa Pinto, Irene Pimentel, 
Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, Jacques Georgel, Philippe Schmitter 
or Yves Léonard; and Neo-salazarists José Hermano Saraiva, 
Franco Nogueira, Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão or Jaime Nogueira 
Pinto. For a fascist interpretation, see Loff, Fernando Rosas, 
Luís Reis Torgal, João Paulo Avelãs Nunes, João Arsénio Nunes, 
Hermínio Martins, D.L. Raby and the special case of Eduardo 
Lourenço. Manuel Villaverde Cabral and Manuel de Lucena 
subscribed to both interpretations on different occasions.
25. See Salazar, 6 vols. (1977-85). Liv. Civilização Editora, Opor-
to; “II Suplemento”, História de Portugal (1981). Liv. Civili-
zação Editora, Oporto.
26. See also Pinto (1993); Pinto (2007). 
27. See Ministério de Educacão, Organização curricular e Progra-
mas, vol. I (“Ensino Básico. 3º Ciclo”), [Lisbon], Reforma Edu-
cativa/DGEBS, [1991], p. 139.
28. See Público [PB] “As minhas cartas dos Arquivos da PIDE” 17 
April 1996. Former minister in a Socialist government, 1976-
77, he moved to openly liberal views, has been present in the 
media ever since and is head of the two major Social Sciences 
research units (the Instituto de Ciências Sociais) which became 
a generously-financed neoconservative elitist think-tank.
29. Expresso [Ex] “Como os líderes vêem Salazar”, 22 April 1989.
30. Six years later, on the 25th anniversary of Salazar’s death, Diário 
de Notícias asked every “leader of the parties represented in Par-
liament” to answer three questions on Salazar and on personal 
memory of his rule, but only the new Socialist (António Gu-
terres) and Communist (Carlos Carvalhas) leaders agreed (see 
Diário de Notícias [DN], Lisbon, 27 July 1995).
31. Branqueamento is the word commonly used in the Portuguese 
public debate.
32. Soares, Mário, [PB] “A superioridade moral da democracia 
[Democracy’s moral superiority]”, 22 April 1994.
33. Sepúlveda, Torcato, [PB] “A revisão da história”, 14 April 1994.
34. “Os abaixo assinados foram presos políticos ou perseguidos 
políticos durante a ditadura fascista ou são familiares ou amigos 
de pessoas perseguidas, presas, ou assassinadas por agentes do 
Estado Novo”, manifesto in [PB], Lisbon, 24 April 1994.
35. Moura, Vasco Graça, [DN] “Portugal e o passado”, 10 April 
1994.
36. Gil, José, [PB] “O silêncio da história”, 9 May 1994.
37. Moura, Vasco Graça, [DN] “Portugal e o passado”, 10 April 
1994.
38. Former servicemen who suffered from PTSD only saw their 
right to State indemnities and medical attention legally recog-
nized in 2000, after the approval of Law No. 46/99, under 
António Guterres’ Socialist Administration. See [PB], 23 June 
1999 and 13 April 2000. See also Quintais (2000). 
39. Half a million fled from the African colonies to Portugal in 
1974-76, several hundred thousand chose to remain in Africa, 
but where the supremacy of white minorities persisted: Ian 
Smith’s Rhodesia and Apartheid South-Africa. For an historio-
graphical appraisal, see Pimenta (2008). For mainstream ac-
counts, see Garcia (2011 and 2012), Marques (2013). In fiction, 
see Figueiredo (2011) and Magalhaes (2008); or State TV series 
Depois do Adeus, RTP/SP Televisão, 2012, script by I.Gomes, 
A.Vasques, C.Dias, J.P.Carneiro, L.Marques, S.Salgado, 
V.Monteiro, historical consultant neoconservative reporter He-
lena Matos.
40. [PB], 6 September 2001.
41. «Quem é para si o maior português de sempre?» http://www.
rtp.pt/programa/tv/p21257 [accessed July 2014]. The show was 
co-produced by RTP and D&D, Portugal, and was presented by 
reporter Maria Elisa Domingues; Nuno Santos was by then Pro-
gram Manager.
 42. Loff, M., [PB] “Uma história em fascículos” (I and I), and Ra-
mos, Rui, [PB] “Um caso de difamação”, 2, 16 and 21 August 
2012; Ramos (2009). 
43. Controversy involved, to mention only those who published in 
the press, Maria Filomena Mónica, António Barreto, Vasco 
Graça Moura, José Manuel Fernandes, Pedro Mexia, João 
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Carlos Espada, Bernardo V. e Sousa, Nuno G. Monteiro and 
Pedro Lomba, all supporting Ramos; Fernando Rosas, João 
Paulo Avelãs Nunes, José Neves, Ricardo Noronha, Luís Reis 
Torgal, Dalila Cabrita Mateus, all critising him; and Diogo 
Ramada Curto, António Guerreiro and Irene Pimentel, criticis-
ing both him and me. Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses (whose Sala-
zar. A Political Biography, first published in the USA, was 
very critical of me in Análise Social, vol. XLVI (2º), Lisbon, 
2011, p. 349-57) describing the controversy in “Slander, Ideo-
logical Differences, or Academic Debate? The ‘Verão Quente’ 
of 2012 and the State of Portuguese Historiography”, in e-
JPH, vol. 10, no. 1, Summer 2012, p. 62-77, in which he chose 
to explain my attitude as of “slanderous, or quasi-slanderous 
nature”, and, from Dublin where he works, pedantically 
claimed that, as “rival historiographies at play in today’s Portu-
gal (...) find it hard to communicate peacefully with each other, 
then it is the task of foreign-based academics to mediate be-
tween the currents”. The right-wing Administration was very 
clear in taking sides: President Cavaco Silva decorated Ramos 
on 2013 National Day (June 10th), Prime-Minister Passos Coel-
ho appointed him to the Board of the Luso-American Founda-
tion (see [PB], Lisbon, 18 November 2013) and the Portuguese 
national agency for scientific and technological research 
(Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia) appointed him to its 
Social Sciences and Humanities board. On each occasion, con-
troversy was generated in social networks, and among histori-
ans and other social scientists.
44. [PB], 6 December 2013.
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